



The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations on Europe

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Europe is experiencing the most intense era of sabotage since the Cold War

Sabotage: ‘Activity conducted for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a foreign power, resulting in **damage to property, sites and data affecting a country’s interests**, and national security. This can be done through, but is not limited to, the use of cyber actions and **physical damage**.’

(UK definition but no European definition of sabotage or CNI exists).




Ukraine sabotage on a Russian railway roughly 100 miles southeast of Moscow (November 2023)



Russian sabotage on a French railway 150km to the south-west of Paris (July 2024)

Suspected Russian activity in Europe

January 2022 - April 2025



Nord Stream pipelines source: HELCOM

Distributed disruption


Russian hybrid-warfare attacks in Europe, Jan 2018-May 2025

- Target
- Energy and communications*
 - Transport
 - Military
 - Water and undersea
 - Other

- Assassinations
Attempted or completed

Ukrainian-linked shipping business set on fire March 2024

Attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal March 2018





LOCATIONS TARGETED BY RUSSIAN OPERATIONS AGAINST EUROPE PER YEAR

GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT OF OPERATIONS

- 2022
- 2023
- 2024

FIGURE 5

- 2022
- 2023
- 2024



Russia's unconventional war on Europe




- **Focus on CNI:** Communications, energy, government, health, industry, military, transport, undersea cables, water;
- **MO** (arson, explosives, anchor-drag, vandalism, UAV ISR, electronic attack, assassination/attempt, weaponised migration).
- **Plausible Deniability:** actor/method/sponsorship
Almost certain / Highly likely / Likely / Realistic possibility
- We used **multi-source corroboration**. Treating actions by third-country nationals or contractors as state-linked when there is evidence of tasking, financing, logistics, or alignment with RIS campaigns.
- Example: *PM Tusk in May 2024: 'It is likely that Russia was involved'* and *PM Tusk in May 2025: 'Poland knows for sure Russia was involved'*

European critical infrastructure is vulnerable

- **Aging infrastructure and lack of investment:** 60% of the EU's total grid investment must be directed toward basic distribution grid upgrades.
- **Europe's rail** still relies on GSM-R (2G) and is only now migrating to FRMCS (4G/5G), requiring years of risky co-existence
- **Hospitals** run long-lived clinical systems/medical devices that can't easily be patched or replaced
- **Legacy and compromised digital systems:** Lithuania continues to use Russia's KLUB-U railway locomotive control system.
- **Vulnerability of naval and water systems:** The Netherlands' hydraulic water management, for example, has been found to be seriously outdated, relying on old computer systems connected to digital networks
- **Seabed & offshore assets are exposed and hard to defend:** Russian vessels and "research" ships have repeatedly surveyed this infrastructure.
- **Detection & attribution gaps create a deterrence problem:** Governments still struggle to attribute beyond reasonable doubt. NATO and the EU have set up coordination cells but legal constraints (eg: in international waters persist).
- **Repair capacity and spares are limited so outages last:** Europe has limited sovereign cable-repair capacity and very few specialised ships worldwide.
- **RIS repeatedly target energy operators' IT/OpTech:** eg: the cloud/identity layer used by those operators.
- **Uneven regulation & fragmented governance across borders:** NIS2 and the CER Directive raise the bar, but transposition/implementation is patchy.

Key points

- Russia's summer offensive failed.
- NATO 2035 and the 5%: The Kremlin can prevail only by stopping European capitals turn latent strength into usable superiority and by sapping their resolve.
- The Kremlin's aim is to impose costs, disrupt resilience, and erode support for Ukraine via sabotage, espionage, and covert action.
- Sabotage activity surged post-2022 and keeps testing European thresholds below open war.
- Confirmed sabotage of critical infrastructure **almost quadrupled from 2023 to 2024**; continued incidents into 2025 including drones, explosive devices, and targeting of CNI (rail network).



Proxies, low-tech, and deniability

- After mass expulsions (~ 400 RIS in 2022): GRU shift to a “gig-economy” model—remote tasking of third-country nationals via Telegram



GREY ZONE

W-SAY PRIVET The war has been going on for the second year.

At the same time, at the beginning of the war, we launched an anonymous communication channel **W-SAY PRIVET** to receive information about the actions and location of the enemy from residents and military personnel of Ukraine. Thanks to those who helped us and are helping us to bring Victory closer and bring Justice. Special thanks to those who help not only with information, but also

W-SAY PRIVET

You've probably already seen what happened in Romania? The United States and Great Britain are increasingly dragging Romania into the war in Ukraine, in particular, using Romania's territory to transport weapons.

Our Romanian friends who said **PRIVET** to us and said **GOODBYE** to dragging the people of Europe into a war not their own.

As a result of accidental circumstances, a liquefied gas distribution station that exported it to Ukraine caught fire in the area of the Romanian city of Siret bordering Ukraine.

Several railway wagons near the same city of Siret, which were transporting UAVs, also burned down.

At the same time, an armament depot for the Ukrainian army in the town of Slobozia, which is located near the Bulgarian border, also caught fire.


You are the ones who boldly said **PRIVET** to us. You are ones the Western establishment is afraid of (t.me/grey_zone/22995), printing one news article after another about you. They are afraid that there will be more of you. And there are more of you (t.me/grey_zone/23344)

We will help you and thank you, just say **PRIVET** to us: [@say_privet_to_the_bot](https://t.me/say_privet_to_the_bot)

@grey_zone 135.6K edited 22:04

Proxies, low-tech, and deniability

- After mass expulsions (~ 400 RIS in 2022): GRU shift to a “gig-economy” model—remote tasking of third-country nationals via Telegram
- GRU Unit 29155 leads physical ops; mix of arson, vandalism, and simple sabotage against single points of failure in ECI



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 - 12 May 2024: Arson attack on Marywilka 44 shopping centre
 - Terrorism: DHL “massager-bomb” tests



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 - Arson: ‘Marywilka shopping centre’
 - 22nd July 2024: DHL “massager-bomb” tests at logistics hubs



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 - Terrorism: DHL “massager-bomb” tests at logistics hubs
 - 25th December 2024: Anchor-dragging damaging Baltic cables (Eagle S)





Thank you